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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
LAW OF THE SEA - DEEP SEABED MINING - United
States Position in Light of Recent Agreement and
Exchange of Notes with Five Countries Involved in
Preparatory Commission of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
FACTS
On August 14, 1987, Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Resolution of Practical
Problems with respect to Deep Seabed Mining Areas (the "Agree-
ment") in an attempt to eliminate overlapping deep seabed mining
sites.' Subsequently, the United States undertook a bilateral exchange
of Notes with the Soviet Union, 2 through which the United States
became "bound by the provisions of the above Agreement in the
same manner as other Parties to that Agreement are bound by its
provisions to the Soviet Party." 3 The United States also exchanged
Notes bilaterally with Belgium, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands.4
These latter exchanges merely affirm that no Party to the Agreement
will terminate its adherence to the Agreement without the others'
concurrence.
The Agreement and the corresponding exchanges of Notes represent
the culmination of several years of negotiations to settle disputes
regarding the overlapping deep seabed mining sites of several sig-
natory-and some non-signatory-states to the United Nations Law
of the Sea Convention (the "LOS Convention").5 The five original
parties to the Agreement joined with the interim governing body of
Belgium-Canada-Italy-Netherlands-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Agree-
ment on the Resolution of Practical Problems with respect to Deep Seabed Mining
Areas, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1502 (1987) [hereinafter Agreement].
2 Exchange of Notes between the United States (with consortia interest and LOS
non-signatory) and the Soviet Union (LOS signatory), 26 I.L.M. 1510 (1987).
3 Id. The Soviet Union also exchanged Notes with the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany.
An example of these Notes appears in 26 I.L.M. 1513, 1514-15 (1987).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/
122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Convention]. See
generally U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, A QUIET REVOLUTION: THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.7 (1984).
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the LOS Convention, the Preparatory Commission, 6 to accelerate the
appointment of pioneer investors7 and to protect the interests of four
multinational consortia.8 The Agreement and the Notes represent
positive changes in the positions of both the United States and the
parties to the LOS Convention as both entities "cooperate" to ad-
vance deep seabed mining operations in international waters. In par-
ticular, the exchange of Notes eliminates the possibility that mining
sites of United States nationals will overlap the sites of certain LOS
Convention signatories, and thus the United States achieves its most
favorable diplomatic and economic position in the area of deep seabed
mining since early 1982.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
When scientists realized that manganese nodules located on the
ocean floor could produce a previously unknown source of mineral
wealth for the world, a new subject area of international law emerged-
deep seabed mining. As various states sought to exploit the deep
seabed, three theories developed regarding the control of this ex-
ploitation. First is the theory of res communes, which views the ocean
bed as the common heritage of mankind, and therefore proposes that
states which exploit the resources beneath international waters should
equitably divide the resulting proceeds among all the nations of the
world.9 The developing countries are the most forceful proponents
of this theory, and the United Nations General Assembly endorsed
this theory by resolution.10 The second theory is that the deep seabed
may be explored and exploited as a freedom of the high seas pursuant
6 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text. The consortia represented
investors from the United States, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
9 Van Dyke and Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas":
Which Governs the Seabed? 19 SAN Drioo L. REv. 493, 497 (1982).
10 In 1970, the United Nations adopted a resolution which proclaimed the deep
seabed as the common heritage of mankind. Declaration of Principles Governing
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970). Although the United States voted in favor of this resolution,
the United States also issued a statement in which it declared the resolution was
not binding and that the United States reserved its right to explore and exploit the
deep seabed until it became a party to an international law of the sea treaty. U.N.
Doc.A/C.1/PV.1799, at 20-21, 28 (1970).
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to customary international law. Although states may not claim sov-
ereignty over specific areas of the seabed, they may decide among
themselves to be bound by others' claims. States should at all times
exercise a reasonable regard for others' rights to explore and exploit
the deep seabed. The United States and many of the developed
countries advocate this view." A third minority theory is that of res
nullius. The proponents of this theory believe that the deep seabed
belongs to no one, and that a state may exercise sovereignty over a
particular area based solely on appropriation.' 2
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (the
"Conference") faced the resolution of these competing theories in
1974 when it met to begin devising a treaty on the international law
of the sea. The idea of a new international economic order 3 con-
siderably influenced the delegates, but the Conference also recognized
states' sovereignty over the subsoil and the seabeds along their coast-
lines. 4 The resulting LOS Convention, approved by the Conference
on April 30, 1982, ultimately embraced the common heritage of
mankind theory. 5 In doing so, the LOS Convention codified some
norms 16 viewed as already-existing customary international law, and
also promulgated new rules in other areas. 7
, Van Dyke and Yuen, supra note 9, at 501-08.
12 Id. at 514-19.
13 The proponents of the new international economic order favored the res com-
munes theory of control of the deep seabed.
14 LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 55-58.
11 LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 136.
16 Reiley, Introduction to a Tempest: The Legal Technological and Political
Dimensions of the 1984 Law of the Sea Conference in San Francisco, 18 U.S.F. L.
Rv. 415, 416 (1984). The provisions incorporated in the treaty included a 12-mile
limit to the territorial seas of coastal states and the right of others to innocent
passage through these states' territorial waters. Further, the treaty established innocent
passage rights for the high seas and for transit though narrow straits. The treaty
also established an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for each coastal state, which
provided for exclusive mineral rights and virtually exclusive economic rights, in
conjunction with environmental restrictions, to the waters and subsoil 200 miles off
their coastlines.
In defining "customary international law," Reiley noted:
It is generally recognized that principles of international law may develop
through custom. Complete agreement does not exist on the means to es-
tablish customary international law and on how long a custom must exist
before it approaches the status of law. It has been suggested that widespread
adoption of the treaty may establish "instant" customary international law.
It this is so, it provides a theory (one of several) for the LOS Convention
to affect non-signers.
Id. at 419.
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The LOS Convention contains a complex set of provisions designed
to regulate the international community's exploitation of the deep
seabed. The LOS Convention establishes two entities to monitor deep
seabed mining activity, an International Seabed Authority (the "Au-
thority") 18 and an International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.' 9
An interim governing body, the Preparatory Commission,2" is re-
sponsible for formulating the rules and regulations of these two
institutions and for registering pioneer seabed mining investors. 2' The
18 LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 156-85. The Authority is the regulatory
body of the LOS Convention and is responsible for the deep seabed mining policies
and activities of the LOS Convention.
19 LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 186-91. The International Tribunal on
the Law of the Sea will include a Seabed Disputes Chamber, an eleven member
group which will decide most of the disputes relating to seabed mining. This group
may decide disputes between states as well as disputes between a state and the
Authority.
Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/121 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) [here-
inafter Draft Final Act]. Resolution I of the Final Act provides for the establishment
of the Preparatory Commission. The Commission is composed of 159 members.
Representatives of the first fifty states which signed or acceded to the Convention
have voting power, but representatives of later signatories participate as observers.
The Commission will surrender its control to the Authority as soon as the Convention
is ratified. See 24 U.N. CHRONICLE 40 (Aug. 1987).
21 Draft Final Act, supra. See also infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. By
creating the special status of "pioneer investor," the Convention recognized those
states and related enterprises which had begun exploration in the deep seabed prior
to the signing of the Convention. Those who qualify as pioneer investors are:
(i) France, India, Japan and the [Soviet Union], or a state enterprise of
each of those states or one natural or juridical person which possesses the
nationality of or is effectively controlled by each of those states, or their
nationals, provided that the state concerned signs the Convention and the
State or state enterprise or natural or juridical person has expended, before
1 January 1983, an amount equivalent to at least $US 30 million (United
States dollars calculated in constant dollars relative to 1982) in pioneer
activities and has expended no less than 10 per cent of that amount in the
location, survey and evaluation of the area referred to in paragraph 3(a);
(ii) four entities, whose components being natural or juridical persons possess
the nationality of one or more of the following states, or are effectively
controlled by one or more of them or their nationals: Belgium, Canada,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America, provided that the certifying state or states sign the Convention
and the entity concerned has expended, before 1 January 1983, the levels
of expenditure for the purpose stated in subparagraph (i);
(iii) any developing state which signs the Convention or any state enterprise
or natural or juridical person which possesses the nationality of such state
or is effectively controlled by it or its nationals, or any group of the
foregoing, which, before 1 January 1985, has expended the levels of ex-
penditure for the purpose stated in subparagraph (i);
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Authority must approve all exploration and exploitation of the deep
seabed, and controls all such activity "on behalf of mankind as a
whole .... "22 To begin mining, miners must apply to the Authority
by providing a proposed work plan.23 The work plan must indicate
two equally workable mine sites. Once the plan is approved, the
Authority will mine one of the sites through its own mining group,
the Enterprise,14 while the applicant will mine the other site under
the Authority's regulations and production limits. 25 This proportionate
sharing of mine sites is known as the parallel system. The applicant
incurs financial responsibilities to the Authority, 26 as well as the
obligation to transfer its technology to the Authority if comparable
technology is not available. 27
Throughout the Conference negotiations, the United States con-
sistently opposed the LOS Convention's provisions on deep seabed
mining, although it accepted most other portions of the treaty. 28 In
particular, the United States objected to (1) provisions that would
allow amendments to enter into force without its approval; (2) the
absence of assured access for future qualified deep seabed miners as
2 LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 153, para. 1.
23 LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 153, para. 3.
24 LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 170. This is the "organ of the Authority
which shall carry out activities in the Area [defined by art. 1 of the LOS Convention
as 'the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction'] directly... , as well as the transporting, processing and marketing of
minerals recovered from the Area."
25 LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 150-51. To protect the economies of those
developing countries which derive the same minerals from terrestrial mining, the
Convention has the right to control the activities of deep seabed miners through
production controls, the granting of economic support, and through participation
in commodity agreements.
2 LOS Convention, supra note 5, Annex III, art. 13. The Commission charges
a fee of $US 500,000 for the administrative costs of processing an application. After
the Commission accepts the application and the contract enters into force, the
contractor will pay a fee of $US 1 million. Thereafter, the contractor will make an
annual financial contribution to the Authority in the form of a production charge,
or a combination of a production charge and a share of the net proceeds. The
amount of the contribution is a percentage of the market value of the processed
metals produced from the polymetallic nodules recovered from the contractor's area.
The contractor's annual amount may be altered to reflect a decline in the contractor's
return of investment.
27 LOS Convention, supra note 5, Annex III, art. 5.
Is President's Statement on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY
CoMp. PREs. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982), reprinted in 82 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2065,
at 71 (Aug. 1982). See Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention, 14
OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 337 (1985).
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a result of the Authority's regulatory power; 29 (3) a decision-making
process that the United States felt would not give it a role that fairly
and adequately protected its interests; (4) provisions that it felt would
deter the future development of deep seabed resources;30 and (5) the
mandatory transfer of technology and the possibility of national
liberation movements sharing in the benefits.3' Thus, upon the in-
corporation of the objectionable provisions into the final version of
the treaty, the United States voted against the treaty.3 2
The United States had already acted unilaterally to codify its views.
Prior to the completion of the LOS Convention, the United States
enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act3 in an effort
to reassure private investors and to inform the United Nations of its
position with regard to the proposed international seabed regime.
34
The United States anticipated that LOS Convention framers would
not re-write the deep seabed provisions,35 and therefore countered
with this national legislation which embodied its interpretation of the
29 Larson, supra note 28, at 340-41.
o See supra note 25.
31 President's Statement on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY
ComP. PREs. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982), reprinted in 82 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2065,
at 71 (Aug. 1982).
32 On April 10, 1982, 130 participants voted in favor of adopting the treaty, four
voted against (United States, Turkey, Israel, and Venezuela), and seventeen abstained
(Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia,
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, the Ukrainian S.S.R., the U.S.S.R., and
the United Kingdom). K. SImxoNDs, THE U.N. CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA vii (1983).
33 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1982). Congress enacted the Act with a view toward
encouraging a "widely acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, which will provide a new
legal order for the oceans covering a broad range of ocean interests, including
exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep
seabed." 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8) (1982).
3" 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(13), (15) and (b)(5) (1982). Congress stated that "the
uncertainty among potential investors [was] . . . likely to discourage or prevent the
investments necessary to develop deep seabed mining technology" and that a Law
of the Sea Treaty was "likely to establish financial arrangements which obligate[d]
the United States or United States citizens to make payments to an international
organization." Thus, one of Congress' purposes in creating the Act was to "encourage
the continued development of technology to recover the hard mineral resources of
the deep seabed."
15 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(9), (10) (1982). Congress noted that "the negotiations to
conclude such a Treaty ... are in progress but may not be concluded in the near
future" and that "even if such negotiations are completed promptly, much time
will elapse before such an international regime is established and in operation."
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law of the sea.36 Under this legislation, the United States issues permits
and licenses to entities seeking to explore the deep seabed, although
explorers could not exploit the deep seabed until January 1, 1988.17
The Act also includes requirements for conferring reciprocal state
status,38 provisions for monitoring the activities of permitees and
licensees,3 9 and provisions for protection of the environment. 40
The Soviet Union also passed national legislation4 l in an effort to
promote continued involvement in deep seabed exploration while
36 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (1982).
It is the legal opinion of the U.S. that exploration for and commercial
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the
high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other
states in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general
principles of international law.
This legal opinion, however, is not as unyielding as the literal language of the statute
suggests:
The United States, which first developed the technology to exploit the
resources, consistently took the position in adopted policy that these re-
sources were to be developed under the auspices of international control
.... The United States, despite its national legislation covering national
control, has consistently argued that control over the resources of the high
seas and sea bed beyond the continental shelf should be internationally
controlled. A close reading of the legislation adopted by the United States
governing sea bed development supports the argument that we are still
committed to this view.
MacRae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea
Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 181, 220-21 (1983).
11 30 U.S.C. § 1412(c)(D) (1982).
38 30 U.S.C. § 1428 (1982). Reciprocal state status means that states must have
enacted deep seabed mining legislation similar to that enacted in the United States
to request that the United States recognize their mine sites.
" 30 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982). As reasonably necessary, the Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration may place federal officials aboard
vessels engaged in exploration or commercial recovery. These officials will ensure
that those engaged in mining activities comply with the environmental restrictions
issued by the Administrator, and will recommend methods of mitigation for possible
environmental effects.
'- 30 U.S.C. § 1419 (1982). These provisions provide for study of the effects of
deep seabed mining, as well as the effects of sea-based processing and disposal at
sea of processing wastes. The Act also requires those who engage in exploration or
exploitation to use "The best available technologies for the protection of safety,
health and the environment . .. ."
4' Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet Enterprises for the Exploration
and Exploitation of Mineral Resources, 21 I.L.M. 551 (1982) [translated from the
Russian text in Izvestiia, April 18, 1982, pp. 1-2]. The Federal Republic of Germany,
19 I.L.M. 1330 (1980); the United Kingdom, 20 I.L.M. 1217 (1981); France, 21
I.L.M. 808 (1982); Italy, 24 I.L.M. 983 (1985); and Japan, 22 I.L.M. 102 (1983),
also enacted legislation on deep seabed mining. The legislation of some of these
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maintaining a commitment to the success of the LOS Convention.
Like that of the United States, the Soviet legislation prohibits ex-
ploitation of the deep seabed until after January 1, 1988. The leg-
islation also provides for the issuance of licenses and permits, the
recognition of the status of reciprocal states,632 and the establishment
of a general sharing trust fund.42
Four private multinational consortia had begun exploration of the
deep seabed prior to the adoption of the LOS Convention. Those
consortia were Ocean Mining Associates, which included investors
from the United States, Belgium, and Italy; Ocean Minerals Company,
which included investors from the United States and the Netherlands;
Ocean Management, Inc., comprised of investors from Canada, the
United States, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany; and the
Kennecott Consortium, comprised of investors from the United States,
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. 4 The four consortia orig-
inally began mining under permits issued by individual states whose
investors were included in the consortia." Later, however, the con-
sortia sought to preserve their rights as pioneer investors45 through
states is quite similar to that enacted in the United States and the Soviet Union.
Further, some of the national legislation contains provisions similar to provisions
in the LOS Convention. For example, the French legislation requires permits and
allows for the recognition of reciprocal state mine sites. Japanese legislation includes
requirements that a miner submit a proposed work plan and settle any problems of
overlapping claims before mining begins.
42 Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet Enterprises for the Exploration
and Exploitation of Mineral Resources, supra note 41.
41 Ocean Mining Associates began work in 1968, Kennecott began in 1974, Ocean
Management began in 1975, and Ocean Minerals Company began in 1977. Also
involved in deep seabed mining were Association Francais pour L'Etude et la Re-
cherche des Nodules (AFERNOD), a state and private enterprise from France; Deep
Ocean Minerals Association (DOMA), a Japanese project; and three state-sponsored
enterprises from the Soviet Union, India, and China. Briscoe and Lambert, Seabed
Mineral Discoveries Within National Jurisdiction and the Future of the Sea, 18
U.S.F. L. REv. 433, 445, n.50 (1984).
" The United States issued permits under the Hard Mineral Resources Act to
Ocean Management, Inc., Ocean Mining Associates, Ocean Minerals Company, and
the Kennecott Consortium. The Federal Republic of Germany issued a permit to
Ocean Management, Inc., and the United Kingdom issued two permits to the Ken-
necott Consortium. Larson, Deep Seabed Mining: A Definition of the Problem, 17
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 271, 281 (1986).
,1 The Convention "provides for the favorable treatment of entities that would
register as pioneer investors (immediate allocation of area, guaranteed issuing of
contract following the entry into force of the Convention, priority with regard to
production authorisations)." Stephanou, A European Perception of the Attitude of
the United States at the Final Stage of UNCLOS III With Respect to the Exploration
of the Deep Sea-Bed in THE NEw LAW oF THE SEA 259, 266 (Rozakis & Stephanou
1983).
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representation in the Preparatory Commission and explicit recognition
in the section of the Draft Final Act of the Convention dealing with
pioneer investors.46
Eventually, France, India, Japan, and the Soviet Union applied to
the Preparatory Commission for registration as pioneer investors.4 7
To obtain pioneer investor status, these states had to "ensure, before
making applications to the Commission ... , that areas in respect
of which applications are made do not overlap one another .... ",48
Although the site chosen by India did not overlap any other sites,
the sites of both Japan and France overlapped the site chosen by
the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's site also overlapped the
sites of three of the four multinational consortia. 49 Under paragraph
5, the Parties were required to resolve these overlap conflicts before
the Commission could accept their applications.5 0
While France, Japan, and the Soviet Union were working with the
Preparatory Commission to resolve the problem of overlapping mine
sites, nationals of France, Japan, and the Netherlands were seeking
a way to protect their investments in the multinational consortia. 5
On August 3, 1984, the governments of France, Japan, and the
Netherlands, without the consent or guidance of the Preparatory
Commission, reached a Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep
46 See supra notes 20-21.
47 The Preparatory Commission received applications from the Soviet Union on
October 24, 1983 (U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/30), from India on February 14, 1984
(U.N. Doc LOS/PCN/32), from Japan on August 22, 1984 (U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/
50), and from France on August 23, 1984 (U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/51).
48 Draft Final Act, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
49 Registration of Pioneer Investors in the International Sea-Bed Area In Accor-
dance With Resolution II of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, Special Issue II, April 1988, at 5. Such a
situation was not unexpected:
The potential for overlapping claims was high, owing to two factors stem-
ming from the nature of the resource itself. First, although there are extensive
deposits of nodules throughout the world's oceans, scientific indicators had
pointed quite early to one region of the north-eastern Pacific in which the
nodules were of economic interest - an area running east to west from
Hawaii to Baja California, and north to south between the Clarion and
Clipperton fracture zones. Secondly, nodules lie in a monolayer, and there-
fore the claim sites must be extensive in two directions.
'o The four countries exchanged the coordinates of their claimed mine sites for
the first time in December 1984. Report on the Fifth Session of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, Nov. 1987, at 115-16.
"1 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Seabed Mining (the "Provisional Understanding") 2 with Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.13 The Provisional Understanding did not provide
for actual recognition of claimed mine sites, but simply provided that
the eight states would consult one another in regard to authorization
and development of mine sites. It also included the January 1, 1988
date for the beginning of exploitation, which is the date included in
the national legislation enacted by the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.5 4 France,
Japan, and the Netherlands stated that they were furthering the goals
of the Commission by taking early notice of potential future conflicts
regarding overlapping mine sites and agreeing on a way to resolve
such conflicts."
Other members of the LOS Convention saw the Provisional Un-
derstanding as a direct threat to the goals of the Convention. The
Group of 7756 stated that the Provisional Understanding violated the
United Nations principle that the seabed was the common heritage
of mankind and that since the Convention was the only authority
governing the deep seabed, the Provisional Understanding was "wholly
illegal." 5 7 The Eastern European States viewed the Understanding as
a "mini-treaty" designed to undermine the efforts of the LOS Con-
52 Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining, reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1354 (1984) [hereinafter Provisional Understanding].
11 A forerunner to the Provisional Understanding was the Agreement Concerning
Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, re-
printed in 21 I.L.M. 950 (1982), signed by the United States, the United Kingdom,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and France on September 2, 1982.
14 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
51 U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/45 (1984) (Japan); U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/46 (1984) (the
Netherlands); U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/47 (1984) (France).
' U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/48 (1984). The Group of 77 is a group of developing
nations which believes that moral and legal principles impose upon the international
community the obligation to share the resources of the deep seabed. Larson, supra
note 44, at 275.
1 U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/48 (1984). Larson, however, concluded that the Pro-
visional Understanding was not illegal:
In respect to the legal status of the Provisional Understanding, there seems
to be little doubt that it is consistent with the U.N. Convention notwith-
standing the objections of the G-77 and the G-EESS [Group of Eastern
European Socialist States]. Sovereign states are free, moreover, to conclude
whatever international agreements they desire so long as they do not conflict
with any principles of customary or conventional international law. The
Provisional Understanding would seem to meet this test.
Larson, supra note 44, at 282.
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vention. They claimed that it was an attempt by western consortia
"to act without control in exploring and exploiting the resources of
the deep seabed." '5 8 This group pointed specifically to the United
States, calling the Provisional Understanding "blatant evidence of
the hegemonistic, imperialistic policy of the current United States
administration, which is aimed against equitable international co-
operation among States in the exploitation of the world's oceans,
against the Convention and the Preparatory Commission.'"'"
On behalf of the parties to the Provisional Understanding, the
Chairman of the delegation of the Netherlands issued a statement to
explain why the Understanding was not illegal or in conflict with the
Draft Final Act and the ideals of the Convention. 6° The parties relied
on their initial statements that the Understanding "was without prej-
udice [or effect] to ... the positions of the parties, or any obligations
assumed by any of the parties, in respect of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea," and maintained that the Un-
derstanding was essentially concerned with conflict resolution. 6'
Meanwhile, the United States continued to issue licenses for ex-
ploration. 62 This action by the United States, in light of the earlier
discontent of several LOS signatories with the Provisional Under-
standing, prompted the Preparatory Commission to issue a Decla-
ration condemning the actions of all states under national legislation. 63
The Preparatory Commission stated that the only regime for the
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed was that established
by the Convention. Thus, any action undertaken outside the Pre-
paratory Commission which was incompatible with the LOS Con-
vention and its related resolutions was illegal and would not be
recognized. The Declaration called upon all states to desist from
11 U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/49 (1984).
59 Id.
60 Statement by the Chairman of the Delegation of the Netherlands on Behalf
of the Delegations of Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan,
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Delivered on 14
August 1984, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/52 (1984).
61 Id.
62 See U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/65 (1985).
63 Declaration Adopted by the Preparatory Commission on 30 August, 1985, U.N.
Doc. LOS/PCN/72 (1985). The Soviet Union assumed essentially the same position
as the Group of 77 and its sister states in the Group of Eastern European Socialist
States, criticizing the unilateral action of the United States and denouncing any
action taken outside the Convention as illegal.
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taking actions which were contrary to the aims of the Preparatory
Commission. 64
The Federal Republic of Germany, an observer to the LOS Con-
vention and a party to the Provisional Understanding, denounced the
Preparatory Commission's Declaration. 6 It viewed the Declaration
as a political move which would be ultimately detrimental to the
overall goals of the Commission. It reminded the Commission that
since the LOS Convention had not been completely ratified, any
action taken outside the realm of the Convention was not illegal.
The Federal Republic of Germany viewed the goals of the Commission
as including the coordination of a system of deep seabed mining that
all interested countries could accept, and saw the Provisional Un-
derstanding as a step in that direction. 6
In 1986, the Soviet Union, France, and Japan still had not gained
pioneer investor status because they could not resolve the problem
of the overlapping mine sites. 67 In a renewed effort to resolve the
difficulties, Japan, France, and the Soviet Union met in Arusha,
Tanzania in February, 1986. Under the guidance of Preparatory
Commission chairman Joseph Warioba, the three countries agreed
upon a method of resolution for the problem of overlapping mine
sites through a settlement process known as the "Arusha Under-
standing. "6
Chairman Warioba and the Commission achieved resolution of the
immediate conflict by asking France, Japan, and the Soviet Union
to voluntarily relinquish portions of the contested areas. The Com-
mission then divided these relinquished portions equally between France
and the Soviet Union and Japan and the Soviet Union. 69 Chairman
Warioba's method of resolution also provided that these three coun-
tries, and specifically the Soviet Union, would relinquish further areas
in advance of actual disputes so that "certain practical problems
[could be resolved] as well as to facilitate the resolution of conflicts
between the claim of the USSR and some of the potential appli-
64 Id.
65 U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/73 (1986).
66 Id.
67 Japan and the Soviet Union had tentatively resolved their conflict before the
February 1986 meeting. LAW OF TiM SEA BULLETIN, Special Issue II, supra note 49,
at 6.
U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/34/Rev.I (1986).
69 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, Special Issue II, supra note 49, at 6.
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cants." 7 0 Thus, the "Arusha Understanding" successfully protected
the interests of the pioneer applicants France, Japan, the Soviet
Union, and India while also protecting the interests of those concerned
with safeguarding the Convention's ideals and the interests of the
signatory and non-signatory consortia members. 71
As a result of the "Arusha Understanding," the Preparatory Com-
mission also produced an Understanding for Proceeding With Deep
Seabed Mining Applications and Overlapping Claims of Mine Sites
on September 5, 1986 (the New York Understanding). 72 This Under-
standing, unanimously adopted by the Preparatory Commission, pro-
vided for the use of the method of resolution devised at Arusha and
set up a timetable and procedures for France, India, Japan, and the
Soviet Union to re-submit their applications73 for pioneer status. The
Commission encouraged these states to use the mechanism of vol-
untarily relinquishing mine sites through "free and frank discussions,
making available to each other at these discussions the necessary data
and information. 7 4 Significantly, the Commission addressed the
probability that the Soviet Union would have claims which overlapped
with United States consortia claims when it encouraged Belgium,
Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands, acting as representatives of the
multinational consortia, to file for pioneer status pursuant to the
timetable set up by the New York Understanding.7 5
The representatives of France, Japan, and the Soviet Union did
not meet the March 1987 deadline for the re-submission of appli-
cations for pioneer investor status. These parties formulated a State-
70 Id. The term "'potential applicant' is used to designate the Western multi-
national consortia which possess the nationality or are controlled by the nations of
the following states: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States of America."
11 Id. France, Japan, and the Soviet Union also relinquished areas which would
suffice for the Authority under the parallel system.
72 U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/L.41/Rev.l (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1326 (1986)
[hereinafter New York Understanding].
11 The Preparatory Commission required that France, India, Japan, and the Soviet
Union re-submit applications by March 25, 1987.
14 New York Understanding, supra note 72.
11 "The negotiations involved all the traditional regional and interest groups and
included both signatories and non-signatories with the indirect participation of US-
based consortia (through Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the United Kingdom)." Report on the Meeting of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea New York, 11 August - 5 September
1986, LAW OF THE SEA BuLLETIN, Nov. 1986, at 38. See also supra note 72.
19881
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
ment of Understanding for Proceeding With Deep Sea-Bed Mining
Applications on April 19, 1987 (the "Statement"). 6 This Statement
extended the original deadline until the next meeting of the Prepar-
atory Commission, then scheduled for summer 1987, and established
that France, Japan, and the Soviet Union would be registered and
considered as pioneer investors jointly. 77
ANALYsIs
On August 3, 1987, the Soviet Union and the representatives of
the multinational consortia also reached a settlement, which was
finalized in the Agreement on the Resolution of Practical Problems
with respect to Deep Seabed Mining Areas (the "Agreement") 78 con-
cluded on August 14, and which ultimately resolved the difficulties
between the Soviet Union and the representatives of the various
multinational consortia by utilizing the mechanism originally devel-
oped at Arusha. The Agreement, combined with the Statement and
the New York Understanding, reconciles the previously conflicting
goals of the Preparatory Commission and the multinational consortia
while taking into account the prior multilateral agreements reached
among the industrialized nations.
This Agreement and the corresponding exchange of Notes produce
a favorable situation for both the United States and the parties to
the LOS Convention. The United States gains political, diplomatic,
and economic advantages with the Preparatory Commission and the
Convention signatories without compromising its ideological position
on the issue of seabed mining, and the Convention signatories obtain
the resolution of some long-lasting conflicts.
Through the Notes, the United States agreed to respect the Soviet
Union's position as delineated in the Agreement. 79 The Agreement,
unlike the 1984 Provisional Understanding80 signed by some of the
same states, provides that the countries recognize each others' claims
76 U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/L.43/Rev.1 (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1725 (1987)
[hereinafter Statement].
7 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, Special Issue II, supra note 49, at 6.
78 Agreement, supra note 1.
79 Id.
80 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The Provisional Understanding did
not recognize specific claims. It provided only that the states would consult one
another in regard to potential overlapping mine sites.
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and respect the boundaries of these claims."' The Agreement also
states that the parties shall not prevent registration of the others'
applications with the Preparatory Commission and that they will
consult with one another on related issues.12 Further, under the Agree-
ment the parties must conform to international law and existing
legislation to ensure that there is no physical interference with the
individual exploration and exploitation activities in the deep seabed
mining areas.83
The Notes serve a dual purpose while the United States continues
mining under national legislation. First, they provide for recognition
of United States mine sites and mining enterprises by the Soviet
Union. This recognition ultimately weakens the Soviet Union's op-
position to the United States theory on freedom of the seas. Second,
the silence of the Preparatory Commission toward the exchange of
Notes, coupled with the fact that the Notes were exchanged on the
day that the Preparatory Commission assisted the five nations in
signing the Agreement to resolve their overlapping mine sites, suggests
that the Preparatory Commission has implicitly recognized the United
States position. Thus, the Agreement and Notes indicate that the
LOS Convention regime for deep seabed mining can exist alongside
the regime advocated by the United States.14
1, Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1, at 1505.
(1) The Parties have agreed on lines the coordinates of which are shown
in Annexes II, III, and IV to this Agreement for the purpose of resolving
practical problems with respect to deep seabed mining areas, the coordinates
of which were exchanged by the Parties in Moscow on December 6, 1986,
and are shown in Annex I.
(2) In this Agreement, "deep seabed mining areas" means areas of the
deep seabed intended for the conduct of exploration and exploitation of
hard mineral resources.
82 Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 3 and 6, at 1506-07.
The Parties shall not act, themselves or in association with third parties,
in a manner that could prevent registration of an application which is
submitted by a Party to the Preparatory Commission ... [and] [wihen
necessary, the Parties will consult on the questions connected with the
implementation of this Agreement.
81 Agreement, supra note 1, art. 5, at 1507.
The Parties shall take all measures in conformity with international law
and existing legislation to ensure that there is no physical interference with
the activities of each other related to exploration and exploitation of hard
mineral resources in the deep seabed mining areas referred to in the Annexes
to this Agreement.
14 The Convention framers did not intend such a situation, as they fully expected
the LOS regime to be the only authority governing the international waters. Kimball,
Turning Points in the Future of Deep Seabed Mining, 17 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.
367, 371-72 (1986).
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The Notes also indicate that the Soviet Union has altered its political
position regarding the United States unilateral mining policy. In 1985
and 1986, the Soviet Union fully supported the Preparatory
Commission85 when the Commission condemned the issuance of li-
censes under national legislation. Now, because the Commission has,
on behalf of the Soviet Union, successfully negotiated a resolution
to the problem of overlapping mine sites which the Soviet Union had
with France, Japan, and the multinational consortia, the Soviet Union8
will be likely to support the Commission's altered position toward
the United States. As the Commission pursues the goal of harmony
among the deep seabed miners, the Soviet Union will acquiesce so
as to protect its own interests, even if such action implies recognition
of United States political ideology.
Moreover, the United States has improved its diplomatic relation-
ship with the Preparatory Commission. The Agreement and the Notes
suggest the restoration of a degree of trust in the United States on
the part of the Preparatory Commission. Both the Preparatory Com-
mission, through its assistance in negotiations surrounding the Agree-
ment, and the United States, through obligations it assumed under
the Notes, have taken steps in the creation of a relationship of
harmonious co-existence in the deep seabed.
Signatory countries to the Convention will probably follow the
Preparatory Commission's lead in recognizing United States involve-
ment in deep seabed mining, though some countries are certain to
see the Preparatory Commission's actions as traitorous to the idea
of a new international economic order. Both the Group of 77 and
the Eastern European Socialist States, excluding the Soviet Union,
will probably denounce the Notes as yet another United States attempt
to destroy equitable international cooperation.17
Its involvement in the negotiations surrounding the Agreement also
indicate that the Preparatory Commission has effectively reversed the
8, See supra note 63 and U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/76 (1986).
86 In 1986, the Soviet Union found itself in an "unexpected position of having
applied for registration as a pioneer investor under Resolution II [of the Draft Final
Act of the convention] but being potentially subject to a blocking vote [on the
Preparatory Commission] by the BINC states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Canada)." Kimball, supra note 84, at 381. The Soviet Union apparently considered
the importance of the consortia to the BINC states and opted to work out an
agreement concerning the overlapping mine sites rather than risk the rejection of its
pioneer investor application. See id. at 382.
87 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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position it took in the 1985 Declaration condemning the actions of
the United States and other countries in forming collateral agreements.
As late as April 1986, the Commission had "reaffirm[ed] its decla-
ration adopted on 30 August 1985 [and] reiterate[d] its rejection of
any claim, agreement or action, including the aforementioned pur-
ported issuing of licenses, undertaken outside the Preparatory Com-
mission which is incompatible with the United Nations Convention
of the Law of the Sea and related resolutions, and regards them as
wholly illegal and devoid of any basis for creating legal rights." ' s8
Today, the Preparatory Commission is participating in, and thus
apparently supporting, the type of agreement it previously condemned.
Furthermore, the Agreement appears to be a gesture of congeniality
by the Preparatory Commission as the representative of the LOS
Convention signtory states. The Preparatory Commission's implicit
acceptance of United States policy should lead to more congenial
dealings in other areas of international concern such as military and
commercial navigational uses of the sea, and protection of the en-
vironment.
The Commission's alteration in its position may be attributed to
several factors. The overall mission and purpose of the Commission
is to register pioneer investors and begin exploration and exploitation
of the deep seabed.8 9 The Agreement will further this purpose by
resolving the current problems of overlapping mine sites and pre-
venting future overlaps. 9°
The Commission, presently funded through United Nations general
funds, also needs more money to begin exploration and exploitation
of the deep seabed. 9' The money that state enterprise pioneer investors
must pay to the Commission once their applications are accepted
should be forthcoming now that the problems of the overlapping
sites have been solved by the Agreement. Likewise, the United States
involvement in the exchange of the Notes should promote among the
" U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/78 (1986).
" See supra notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text.
90 LAw OF THE SEA BULLETIN, Special Issue II, supra note 49, at 7-8.
The Secretary General [of the United Nations] hailed the resolution of
conflicts between the first group of applicants and the potential applicants
[the Western multinational consortia which possess the nationality or are
controlled by the nationals of the following states: Belgium, Canada, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom,
and United States of America] as "one of the most significant developments
in the law of the sea since the adoption of the Convention."
91 See 23 U.N. CHROMCLE 66, 67 (Feb. 1986).
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multinational consortia a favorable view of the Preparatory Com-
mission, and further financial pledges should materialize in the near
future.
The LOS Convention now stands a better chance of ratification
by those countries who have signed but not yet ratified. The Pre-
paratory Commission was offered an opportunity to overcome ob-
stacles between some of the most active members of the Convention,
as well as an opportunity to gain the trust of a powerful opponent
of action taken under the auspices of the Convention. 92 By assisting
in the negotiations for the Agreement, advancing the interests of four
United States allies, and including the United States in the negotia-
tions, the Preparatory Commission has generated a vote of confidence
for itself, furthered its purpose of registering pioneer investors and
promoting the treaty for ratification, and increased funding. 93 The
disappointment felt by delegates from the Third World and the Pre-
paratory Commission at the delay of the implementation of the Draft
Final Act should be alleviated by the probable acceleration of the
pioneer investor registration. 94 Additionally, the solution to the prob-
lem of the overlapping mine sites may provoke more of the major
non-member states95 to ratify the Convention, thus indicating to
smaller states their support of the international regime.
Despite these compromises, the United States has not capitulated
to the LOS Convention philosophy or compromised its ideological
position. It still views the right to mine the resources of the deep
seabed as a freedom of the high seas. The United States has not
recognized any parts of the Convention other than those which codify
92 In 1986, Larson wrote, "[considering] the present ideological and political
antipathy that exists between the U.S. and the G-77 over such things as the New
International Economic Order, the Common Heritage of Mankind, the International
Seabed Authority . . . it is rather doubtful that the political future of deep seabed
mining will be stable and predictable for the next several years." Larson, supra note
44, at 279.
93 Thus, the question of "... whether the Preparatory Commission [could]
implement the Convention deep seabed mining regime in a manner that will clarify
and modify the mining provisions sufficiently to make it acceptable to the major
mining states" appears to have been partially resolved. Kimball, supra note 84, at
373.
I d. at 390.
91 As of 8 April 1988, 35 states had ratified the Convention. Sixth Session of
Preparatory Commission for International Sea-Bed Authority and International Tri-
bunal for Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. Press Release, U.N. Doc. SEA/936, 11 April
1988. Sixty ratifications are necessary for the treaty's entry into force. LOS Con-
vention, supra note 5, art. 308(1).
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customary international law of the sea or reflect United States policy.
Thus, the exchange of Notes does not bind the United States to any
part of the Convention.
The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union
should improve as a result of the Agreement and the exchange of
Notes, as should the relationship between the United States and the
Preparatory Commission. The Notes provide a mechanism for the
parties to achieve their collective objective of mining the deep seabed
with a minimum of conflict. The parties have maintained their basic
legal and political convictions while furthering economic interests,
and the success of these negotiations should promote future nego-
tiations regarding other aspects of the law of the sea.
Katherine Dixon

